中美高层各自密谋过程的对比

[gounahaozi]

1976年9月9日毛泽东逝世，身为中共中央第一副主席的华国锋成为党内排名第一的领导人，在治丧初期华国锋就计划解决“四人帮”问题[25]:672。9月11日，华国锋向李先念交底，通过李居中联系，与叶剑英取得一致意见。华国锋积极行动，又得到中共中央办公厅主任汪东兴、中央军委负责人陈锡联、北京市委和北京卫戍区负责人吴德等人的支持，在力量对比上完全压倒了“四人帮”。华国锋考虑过开会解决和武力解决两种方式，9月21日与叶剑英密谈后初步确定以后者“隔离审查”的方式强硬解决。9月26日晚，华征求李、吴的意见后一致认为，在政治局会议获得多数票有把握，在中央全会则无把握，通过党内斗争的正常程序已无法顺利拿下“四人帮”，遂决定“先斩后奏”，待果断处置“四人帮”之后再召开政治局会议追认。叶剑英获悉商议结果后表示完全同意[25]:695[26]。这种“半合法”的方式是特殊情况下不得不采取的特殊手段，得到陈云“不可避免”、“下不为例”的表态支持[27]。汪东兴负责抓捕行动，10月4日确定了具体行动计划[25]:697-698。10月6日，抓捕行动按计划展开，华国锋以讨论《毛泽东选集第五卷》的名义，召集王洪文、张春桥、姚文元在怀仁堂开会，晚8时左右，三人先后抵达，即由华、叶、汪宣布对其“隔离审查”，几乎同时，江青、毛远新分别在住处被宣布“隔离审查”和“就地监护”，谢静宜、迟群等“四人帮”党羽在北京市委被控制。10月6日10时许，华国锋在北京西郊玉泉山9号楼（叶剑英住处）主持召开中央政治局紧急会议[21]:301。在会上宣布粉碎“四人帮”是毛泽东的遗愿、“四人帮”被抓是文化大革命的胜利[10]:146。政治局会议一致同意推选华国锋为中央委员会主席和中央军委主席，待召开中央全会时予以追认。[28]至此，华国锋成为了中国的最高领导人。

解决“四人帮”后，华国锋派耿飚等人连夜控制了中央人民广播电台和人民日报社等机关。随后，华国锋又派中央工作组控制了“四人帮”的根据地上海，消除了“四人帮”余党发动民兵叛乱的隐患[29][30]。10月14日，中央公布了粉碎四人帮的消息，全国欢声沸腾，毛泽东去世之后的沉闷局面一扫而空[31]。 10月24日，在大海航行靠舵手的背景音乐下，华国锋首次在天安门城楼亮相，接见了百万群众庆祝粉碎四人帮游行，被称为“英明领袖”。


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Military decisions in the wake of 9/11


On the afternoon of September 11, Rumsfeld issued rapid orders to his aides to look for evidence of possible Iraqi involvement in regard to what had just occurred, according to notes taken by senior policy official Stephen Cambone. "Best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit S.H." – meaning Saddam Hussein – "at same time. Not only UBL" (Osama bin Laden), Cambone's notes quoted Rumsfeld as saying. "Need to move swiftly – Near term target needs – go massive – sweep it all up. Things related and not."[87][88]

In the first emergency meeting of the National Security Council on the day of the attacks, Rumsfeld asked, "Why shouldn't we go against Iraq, not just al-Qaeda?" with his deputy Paul Wolfowitz adding that Iraq was a "brittle, oppressive regime that might break easily—it was doable," and, according to John Kampfner, "from that moment on, he and Wolfowitz used every available opportunity to press the case."[89] President George W. Bush reacted to Rumsfeld's suggestion, "Wait a minute, I didn't hear a word said about him (Saddam Hussein) being responsible for the attack"[90] and the idea was initially rejected at the behest of Secretary of State Colin Powell, but, according to Kampfner, "Undeterred Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz held secret meetings about opening up a second front—against Saddam. Powell was excluded." In such meetings they created a policy that would later be dubbed the Bush Doctrine, centering on "pre-emption" and the war on Iraq, which the PNAC had advocated in their earlier letters.[91]

Richard A. Clarke, the White House counter-terrorism coordinator at the time, has revealed details of another National Security Council meeting the day after the attacks, during which officials considered the U.S. response. Already, he said, they were certain al-Qa'ida was to blame and there was no hint of Iraqi involvement. "Rumsfeld was saying we needed to bomb Iraq," according to Clarke. Clarke then stated, "We all said, 'No, no, al-Qa'ida is in Afghanistan.'" Clarke also revealed that Rumsfeld complained in the meeting, "there aren't any good targets in Afghanistan and there are lots of good targets in Iraq."[92] Rumsfeld even suggested to attack other countries like Libya and Sudan, arguing that if this was to be a truly "global war on terror" then all state sponsors of terrorism should be dealt with.[93]

Rumsfeld wrote in Known and Unknown, "Much has been written about the Bush administration's focus on Iraq after 9/11. Commentators have suggested that it was strange or obsessive for the President and his advisers to have raised questions about whether Saddam Hussein was somehow behind the attack. I have never understood the controversy. I had no idea if Iraq was or was not involved, but it would have been irresponsible for any administration not to have asked the question."[39]: 347 

A memo written by Rumsfeld dated November 27, 2001, considers an Iraq war. One section of the memo questions "How start?", listing multiple possible justifications for a U.S.-Iraq War.[94]