俄对美英德法波乌等战争之Bakhmut之战末，和然后，和中国，和宇宙，和其她
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Re: 俄对美英德法波乌等战争之Bakhmut之战末，和然后，和中国，和宇宙，和其她
it all ended with the time for both sides to declare a great victory and a very special destruction of a great part of its enemy forcesmeiyoumajia 写了： 2023年 5月 20日 10:40 本页超过 30 条嵌入内容，超出的已被忽略！
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---i
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Re: 俄对美英德法波乌等战争之Bakhmut之战末，和然后，和中国，和宇宙，和其她
there went the call
the official and final call
---i
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the official and final call
---i
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Re: 俄对美英德法波乌等战争之Bakhmut之战末，和然后，和中国，和宇宙，和其她
Russia Adapted Arms and Tactics Ahead of Ukraine Offensive
Sober assessment ahead of pivotal Ukraine counteroffensive
Even ridiculed ‘human waves’ and aging tanks pose threat
ByMarc Champion
May 18, 2023, 11:01 PM UTCUpdated onMay 19, 2023, 6:45 AM UTC
Share this article
Russia’s military has changed the way it fights 15 months into its disastrous invasion of Ukraine and poses a significant threat as Kyiv prepares a major counteroffensive, a study released Friday said.
Widespread perceptions of Russian army weakness are in some cases either out of date or misconceived according to the 30-page report by the UK’s Royal United Services Institute.
While the report described a military which is often dysfunctional, over-reliant on artillery and suffering poor morale, it said the focus on these weaknesses means Russia’s battlefield advances have often been overlooked.
The study was drawn from April-May field interviews with 10 Ukrainian brigades that had fought Russian units across the war. It wasn’t possible to confirm the claims independently.
Russia’s military is far from the spent force often characterized, according to Nick Reynolds, one of the report’s two authors.
“There is a lot being thrown around on social media to suggest Russia’s lack of capacity, but social media is awash with propaganda on both sides and at this stage we thought a more sober assessment was needed,” Reynolds said, adding that expectations for Ukraine have been set “very, very high.”
Understanding how Russia has changed its approach matters not just to Ukraine, but also to members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that face an increasingly hostile and evolving rival in Moscow, the report said.
Russia has largely remedied early failures in battlefield air defense by properly connecting missiles systems and their sensors along the invasion’s 1,200 kilometer (750 mile) front, according to the report.
As a result, Russian forces have been able to largely shut down the threat from Ukraine’s radar-seeking HARM missiles, intercept rockets and down a low-flying Ukrainian combat jet from 150 kilometers.
Russia’s electronic warfare capabilities, now deployed from airborne to platoon level, are evolving constantly. That’s costing Ukraine 10,000 drones per month. Russian forces appear able to decipher Ukraine’s encrypted Motorola communications systems in real time, according to the report.
relates to Russia Adapted Arms and Tactics Ahead of Ukraine Offensive
Adapting Tanks and Units
On the ground, Russian combat engineers were able to build pontoon bridges at speed even at the start of the war and are now creating trench defenses and complex minefields that any offensive will have to break through.
Russian command centers, which proved vulnerable to precision attacks by US HIMARS rockets last July, and routinely had their communications hacked, are now dug into hardened bunkers. They’ve commandeered local phone networks in occupied territories, isolating and dedicating them to the war.
Russia’s army made its T-80 and T-72 main battle tanks less vulnerable to Ukraine’s arsenal of Western anti-tank weapons by improving their explosive armor defenses and making them less detectable to heat-seeking missiles.
Russia was widely ridiculed in the West for deploying aging T-55 and T-62 tanks, yet they pose “a serious battlefield threat,” the report said. That’s because they aren’t being used as tanks, but in a fire support role as infantry fighting vehicles that have heavier armor and bigger guns.
The much criticized shift to fight in so-called ‘human waves’ around the eastern city of Bakhmut was a rational, if brutal response to the large losses of armor, experienced troops and artillery munitions Russia suffered earlier in the war, the report said.
The technique involves organizing small groups of “disposable” lightly armed infantry into troops used to expose Ukrainian positions, followed by more experienced and better armed units, according to RUSI.
“Overall, this force structure is a cynical but coherent solution to the problem facing the Russian ground forces; they are able to mobilize large numbers of personnel but most units are poor quality,” the report said.
Missile Strikes
None of this can hide the fact that Russia’s vaunted military has badly underperformed, failing to achieve President Vladimir Putin’s ambitious targets for subduing a country the size of France.
The delivery of British and French long-range cruise missiles to Ukraine in recent days has posed a serious new challenge for Russian command assets deep behind the front lines, according to a person close to the Russian defense ministry.
The army is encountering modern NATO-standard arms for the first time and has struggled to cope, according to RUSI’s Reynolds and his co-author, Jack Watling. That mismatch may have been on display in recent days, when Ukraine said it used a newly-acquired Patriot air-defense system to shoot down down several of Russia’s latest Kinzhal hypersonic missiles.
Russia said missiles fired Tuesday night had hit their targets and that a Kinzhal destroyed the Patriot battery. Russia said missiles fired Tuesday night had hit their targets and that a Kinzhal destroyed the Patriot battery. Deputy Pentagon press secretary Sabrina Singh said on Thursday that the system had suffered minor damage, had been repaired and was back online.
The shift from attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure could indicate a Russian intent to hit and degrade military targets ahead of the counteroffensive, yet that’s unclear, according to Ben Barry, senior fellow for land forces at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
If the targets are indeed military, “the Ukrainians would not necessarily be telling us,” Barry said.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... #xj4y7vzkg
Sober assessment ahead of pivotal Ukraine counteroffensive
Even ridiculed ‘human waves’ and aging tanks pose threat
ByMarc Champion
May 18, 2023, 11:01 PM UTCUpdated onMay 19, 2023, 6:45 AM UTC
Share this article
Russia’s military has changed the way it fights 15 months into its disastrous invasion of Ukraine and poses a significant threat as Kyiv prepares a major counteroffensive, a study released Friday said.
Widespread perceptions of Russian army weakness are in some cases either out of date or misconceived according to the 30-page report by the UK’s Royal United Services Institute.
While the report described a military which is often dysfunctional, over-reliant on artillery and suffering poor morale, it said the focus on these weaknesses means Russia’s battlefield advances have often been overlooked.
The study was drawn from April-May field interviews with 10 Ukrainian brigades that had fought Russian units across the war. It wasn’t possible to confirm the claims independently.
Russia’s military is far from the spent force often characterized, according to Nick Reynolds, one of the report’s two authors.
“There is a lot being thrown around on social media to suggest Russia’s lack of capacity, but social media is awash with propaganda on both sides and at this stage we thought a more sober assessment was needed,” Reynolds said, adding that expectations for Ukraine have been set “very, very high.”
Understanding how Russia has changed its approach matters not just to Ukraine, but also to members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that face an increasingly hostile and evolving rival in Moscow, the report said.
Russia has largely remedied early failures in battlefield air defense by properly connecting missiles systems and their sensors along the invasion’s 1,200 kilometer (750 mile) front, according to the report.
As a result, Russian forces have been able to largely shut down the threat from Ukraine’s radar-seeking HARM missiles, intercept rockets and down a low-flying Ukrainian combat jet from 150 kilometers.
Russia’s electronic warfare capabilities, now deployed from airborne to platoon level, are evolving constantly. That’s costing Ukraine 10,000 drones per month. Russian forces appear able to decipher Ukraine’s encrypted Motorola communications systems in real time, according to the report.
relates to Russia Adapted Arms and Tactics Ahead of Ukraine Offensive
Adapting Tanks and Units
On the ground, Russian combat engineers were able to build pontoon bridges at speed even at the start of the war and are now creating trench defenses and complex minefields that any offensive will have to break through.
Russian command centers, which proved vulnerable to precision attacks by US HIMARS rockets last July, and routinely had their communications hacked, are now dug into hardened bunkers. They’ve commandeered local phone networks in occupied territories, isolating and dedicating them to the war.
Russia’s army made its T-80 and T-72 main battle tanks less vulnerable to Ukraine’s arsenal of Western anti-tank weapons by improving their explosive armor defenses and making them less detectable to heat-seeking missiles.
Russia was widely ridiculed in the West for deploying aging T-55 and T-62 tanks, yet they pose “a serious battlefield threat,” the report said. That’s because they aren’t being used as tanks, but in a fire support role as infantry fighting vehicles that have heavier armor and bigger guns.
The much criticized shift to fight in so-called ‘human waves’ around the eastern city of Bakhmut was a rational, if brutal response to the large losses of armor, experienced troops and artillery munitions Russia suffered earlier in the war, the report said.
The technique involves organizing small groups of “disposable” lightly armed infantry into troops used to expose Ukrainian positions, followed by more experienced and better armed units, according to RUSI.
“Overall, this force structure is a cynical but coherent solution to the problem facing the Russian ground forces; they are able to mobilize large numbers of personnel but most units are poor quality,” the report said.
Missile Strikes
None of this can hide the fact that Russia’s vaunted military has badly underperformed, failing to achieve President Vladimir Putin’s ambitious targets for subduing a country the size of France.
The delivery of British and French long-range cruise missiles to Ukraine in recent days has posed a serious new challenge for Russian command assets deep behind the front lines, according to a person close to the Russian defense ministry.
The army is encountering modern NATO-standard arms for the first time and has struggled to cope, according to RUSI’s Reynolds and his co-author, Jack Watling. That mismatch may have been on display in recent days, when Ukraine said it used a newly-acquired Patriot air-defense system to shoot down down several of Russia’s latest Kinzhal hypersonic missiles.
Russia said missiles fired Tuesday night had hit their targets and that a Kinzhal destroyed the Patriot battery. Russia said missiles fired Tuesday night had hit their targets and that a Kinzhal destroyed the Patriot battery. Deputy Pentagon press secretary Sabrina Singh said on Thursday that the system had suffered minor damage, had been repaired and was back online.
The shift from attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure could indicate a Russian intent to hit and degrade military targets ahead of the counteroffensive, yet that’s unclear, according to Ben Barry, senior fellow for land forces at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
If the targets are indeed military, “the Ukrainians would not necessarily be telling us,” Barry said.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... #xj4y7vzkg
Re: 俄对美英德法波乌等战争之Bakhmut之战末，和然后，和中国，和宇宙，和其她
prigozhin's victory troll/declaration :::::::::::
(he got angry if the daily wagner death toll was over 84. the highest number he put out was something like 118 or so. for multiple times, he said the number should be "5 times lower", or around 20s. the number could be higher at the time he showed his wrath like a big cat)
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(he got angry if the daily wagner death toll was over 84. the highest number he put out was something like 118 or so. for multiple times, he said the number should be "5 times lower", or around 20s. the number could be higher at the time he showed his wrath like a big cat)
本页超过 30 条嵌入内容，超出的已被忽略！
Re: 俄对美英德法波乌等战争之Bakhmut之战末，和然后，和中国，和宇宙，和其她
We publish an addition to the appeal of Evgeny Prigozhin:
“What I did not say during my statement in Bakhmut, and what needs to be added. As the saying goes, you can't take words out of a song. There is the concept of "Methodology of operational-tactical calculations", which was approved by the General Staff and last re-approved in 2017 by the current leadership of the Ministry of Defense. According to this "Method of operational-tactical calculations", based on the number of the enemy and the operation conducted by the PMC "Wagner", PMC "Wagner" should have been 23 times larger in number, weapons should have been 27 times more in number, and shells were given to us by 11,5%. These are absolutely accurate, verified figures, in accordance with all orders of the General Staff. Draw conclusions: our efficiency and the betrayal that went around us. Now we can talk about it."
“What I did not say during my statement in Bakhmut, and what needs to be added. As the saying goes, you can't take words out of a song. There is the concept of "Methodology of operational-tactical calculations", which was approved by the General Staff and last re-approved in 2017 by the current leadership of the Ministry of Defense. According to this "Method of operational-tactical calculations", based on the number of the enemy and the operation conducted by the PMC "Wagner", PMC "Wagner" should have been 23 times larger in number, weapons should have been 27 times more in number, and shells were given to us by 11,5%. These are absolutely accurate, verified figures, in accordance with all orders of the General Staff. Draw conclusions: our efficiency and the betrayal that went around us. Now we can talk about it."