Predicting pandemics might still be impossible, but with millions of lives at stake, researchers are using the latest science and lessons from history to best prepare for the next big one
https://www.scientificamerican.com/arti ... -pandemic/
独家：有争议的美国科学家为大流行研究创造了致命的新流感毒株, 科学家们对创造一种可能使人类免疫系统失去防御能力的病毒表示恐惧
版主： Softfist
Re: 独家：有争议的美国科学家为大流行研究创造了致命的新流感毒株, 科学家们对创造一种可能使人类免疫系统失去防御能力的病毒表示恐惧
What Will the Next Influenza Pandemic Look Like?
Predicting pandemics might still be impossible, but with millions of lives at stake, researchers are using the latest science and lessons from history to best prepare for the next big one
https://www.scientificamerican.com/arti ... -pandemic/
Predicting pandemics might still be impossible, but with millions of lives at stake, researchers are using the latest science and lessons from history to best prepare for the next big one
https://www.scientificamerican.com/arti ... -pandemic/
Re: 独家：有争议的美国科学家为大流行研究创造了致命的新流感毒株, 科学家们对创造一种可能使人类免疫系统失去防御能力的病毒表示恐惧
Scientists Brace for Media Storm Around Controversial Flu Studies
https://www.science.org/content/article ... lu-studies
https://www.science.org/content/article ... lu-studies
Re: 独家：有争议的美国科学家为大流行研究创造了致命的新流感毒株, 科学家们对创造一种可能使人类免疫系统失去防御能力的病毒表示恐惧
mlgb的，能不能把千老都击毙了？
beijingren3 写了： 2022年 12月 17日 18:17 Exclusive: Controversial US scientist creates deadly new flu strain for pandemic research
Scientists express horror over the creation of a virus that could render the human immune system defenceless
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/scie ... 77088.html
If printing money would end poverty, printing diplomas would end stupidity.
Re: 独家：有争议的美国科学家为大流行研究创造了致命的新流感毒株, 科学家们对创造一种可能使人类免疫系统失去防御能力的病毒表示恐惧
Amid massive security, bird flu virus research awaits approval
University of Wisconsin-Madison center aims to prepare people for possible mutations
https://archive.jsonline.com/features/h ... 3361.html/
Re: 独家：有争议的美国科学家为大流行研究创造了致命的新流感毒株, 科学家们对创造一种可能使人类免疫系统失去防御能力的病毒表示恐惧
“The influenza virus is sensitive to detergent,” he reportedly said while explaining the process of showering out. “They die.” A biosafety staffer at the University of Wisconsin got up before a university audience to dispel what she called myths about lab oversight. The address was broadcast on local television.
https://www.pbs.org/video/university-pl ... ch-ep-696/
https://www.pbs.org/video/university-pl ... ch-ep-696/
Re: 独家：有争议的美国科学家为大流行研究创造了致命的新流感毒株, 科学家们对创造一种可能使人类免疫系统失去防御能力的病毒表示恐惧
State incidents highlight bioterror lab concerns
https://www.postcrescent.com/story/news ... /28089943/
https://www.postcrescent.com/story/news ... /28089943/
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wanmeishijie（石昊）
- 论坛元老
wanmeishijie 的博客 - 帖子互动： 2069
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Re: 独家：有争议的美国科学家为大流行研究创造了致命的新流感毒株, 科学家们对创造一种可能使人类免疫系统失去防御能力的病毒表示恐惧
难道是小日本放毒？
理解了老将是代入狗的视角之后，你就理解了老将
viewtopic.php?t=120513
理解了它们是代入狗的视角之后，它们为什么会嘲笑不愿意当狗的人，以及为什么会害怕想要反抗的人，就都可以理解了：
“放着好好的狗不当”
viewtopic.php?t=120513
理解了它们是代入狗的视角之后，它们为什么会嘲笑不愿意当狗的人，以及为什么会害怕想要反抗的人，就都可以理解了：
“放着好好的狗不当”
Re: 独家：有争议的美国科学家为大流行研究创造了致命的新流感毒株, 科学家们对创造一种可能使人类免疫系统失去防御能力的病毒表示恐惧
Others agree that the accidents were not unusual or reckless but contend that when it comes to experiments with a small but real chance of ravaging the population, safety and ethics are inextricable. “We should be brave enough to say that some experiments should not be done,” said Simon Wain-Hobson, a virologist at the Pasteur Institute in Paris who supported restrictions on controversial gain-of-function research in the wake of the 2011 studies. Because such work accounts for a small proportion of biomedical science, he argued, “This is not an attack on the scientific system. It is about protecting the integrity of the scientific system and society as a whole.”
Re: 独家：有争议的美国科学家为大流行研究创造了致命的新流感毒株, 科学家们对创造一种可能使人类免疫系统失去防御能力的病毒表示恐惧
In a detailed analysis of NIH’s grant database last year, the Washington Post identified a total of eight projects that appear to have warranted review.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/i ... e-shadows/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/i ... e-shadows/
Re: 独家：有争议的美国科学家为大流行研究创造了致命的新流感毒株, 科学家们对创造一种可能使人类免疫系统失去防御能力的病毒表示恐惧
Today, research with potential pandemic pathogens is again in the spotlight. In February, NIH charged a committee called the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity with reconsidering the P3CO policy, along with a policy on dual-use research. The NSABB has a fraught history, and its members are appointed by NIH itself. “There is an inherent conflict of interest in having a group appointed by an agency to review that agency’s work,” said Koblentz.
Wholesale roster change coming for US biosecurity board
https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/biosecurity- ... rity-board
Wholesale roster change coming for US biosecurity board
https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/biosecurity- ... rity-board
Re: 独家：有争议的美国科学家为大流行研究创造了致命的新流感毒株, 科学家们对创造一种可能使人类免疫系统失去防御能力的病毒表示恐惧
Others say that nothing short of a dramatic shift in worldviews is needed. Jesse Bloom, an evolutionary virologist at Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center, compared it to research on human subjects. Until the 1970s, scientists regularly carried out experiments on prisoners, including for infection studies. Over time, opinions shifted. “At some point, it became accepted that even though experiments on prisoners were scientifically informative, they just aren’t ethical to do,” said Bloom.
HOMOLOGOUS AND HETEROLOGOUS RESISTANCE TO RHINOVIRUS COMMON COLD Get access Arrow
WILLIAM F. FLEET, ROBERT B. COUCH, THOMAS R. CATE, VERNON KNIGHT
American Journal of Epidemiology, Volume 82, Issue 2, September 1965, Pages 185–196, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.aje.a120543
Published: 01 September 1965 Article history
https://academic.oup.com/aje/article-ab ... ogin=false
HOMOLOGOUS AND HETEROLOGOUS RESISTANCE TO RHINOVIRUS COMMON COLD Get access Arrow
WILLIAM F. FLEET, ROBERT B. COUCH, THOMAS R. CATE, VERNON KNIGHT
American Journal of Epidemiology, Volume 82, Issue 2, September 1965, Pages 185–196, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.aje.a120543
Published: 01 September 1965 Article history
https://academic.oup.com/aje/article-ab ... ogin=false
Re: 独家：有争议的美国科学家为大流行研究创造了致命的新流感毒株, 科学家们对创造一种可能使人类免疫系统失去防御能力的病毒表示恐惧
The U.S. is funding dangerous experiments it doesn’t want you to know about
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions ... story.html
Marc Lipsitch is a professor of epidemiology and director of the Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. Tom Inglesby is director of the Center for Health Security and an environmental health and engineering professor at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.
Sign up for a weekly roundup of thought-provoking ideas and debates
In 2014, U.S. officials imposed a moratorium on experiments to enhance some of the world’s most lethal viruses by making them transmissible by air, responding to widespread concerns that a lab accident could spark a global pandemic. Most infectious-disease studies pose modest safety risks, but given that these proposed experiments intended to create a highly contagious flu virus that could spread among humans, the government concluded the work should not go on until it could be approved through a specially created, rigorous review process that considered the dangers.
Apparently, the government has decided the research should now move ahead. In the past year, the U.S. government quietly greenlighted funding for two groups of researchers, one in the United States and the other in the Netherlands, to conduct transmission-enhancing experiments on the bird flu virus as they were originally proposed before the moratorium. Amazingly, despite the potential public-health consequences of such work, neither the approval nor the deliberations or judgments that supported it were announced publicly. The government confirmed them only when a reporter learned about them through non-official channels.
This lack of transparency is unacceptable. Making decisions to approve potentially dangerous research in secret betrays the government’s responsibility to inform and involve the public when approving endeavors, whether scientific or otherwise, that could put health and lives at risk.
We are two of the hundreds of researchers, medical and public-health professionals, and others who publicly opposed these experiments when they were first announced. In response to these concerns, the government issued a framework in 2017 for special review of “enhanced” pathogens that could become capable of causing a pandemic. Under that framework, reviewers must consider the purported benefits and the potential risks and, before approving the work, determine “that the potential risks as compared to the potential benefits to society are justified.”
The framework also requires that experts in public-health preparedness and response, biosafety, ethics and law, among others, evaluate the work, but it is unclear from the public record if that happened. No description of who reviewed these proposals has been provided. It is not stated what evidence was considered, how competing claims were evaluated or whether there were potential conflicts of interest.
This secrecy means we don’t know how these requirements were applied, if at all, to the experiments now funded by the government. A spokesperson from the Department of Health and Human Services told Science magazine that the agency cannot make the reviews public because doing so might reveal proprietary information about the applicants’ plans that could help their competitors. This bureaucratic logic implies that it is more important to maintain the trade secrets of a few prominent scientists than to let citizens — who bear the risk if an accident happens and who fund their work — scrutinize the decisions of public officials about whether these studies are worth the risk.
As researchers, we understand the usual logic for keeping scientific grant reviews confidential. But this is not ordinary science. The overwhelming majority of scientific studies are safe; even the worst imaginable accident, such as an infection of a lab worker or an explosion, is unlikely and would harm only a handful of people. But creating potentially pandemic pathogens creates a risk — albeit a small one — of infecting millions of people with a highly dangerous virus. For this kind of research, there is no justification for keeping risk-benefit deliberations secret.
Waiving confidentiality when lives are at stake is a standard practice. Health-care providers must report if their patients present an imminent threat to themselves or others, and drugmakers must disclose many facts about their products before approval in service of protecting public health and safety.
We have serious doubts about whether these experiments should be conducted at all. We also suspect that few members of the public would find compelling the rationale that the best way to fight the flu is to create the most contagious, lethal virus possible in a lab. But with deliberations kept behind closed doors, none of us will have the opportunity to understand how the government arrived at these decisions or to judge the rigor and integrity of that process.
Ultimately, public awareness is not enough. The debate in the United States over the past five years took place mainly among a small group of scientists and made only token efforts to inform or engage the wider citizenry. We need public discussion and debate about the risks and benefits of these kinds of experiments. And because viruses do not respect borders, the conversation must move beyond the national level, to coordinate the regulation of dangerous science internationally.
At stake here is the credibility of science, which depends on public support to continue. Science is a powerful driver of human health, well-being and prosperity, and nearly all of it can be done without putting populations at risk. If governments want to fund exceptionally risky science, they should do so openly and in a way that promotes public awareness and engagement.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions ... story.html
Marc Lipsitch is a professor of epidemiology and director of the Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. Tom Inglesby is director of the Center for Health Security and an environmental health and engineering professor at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.
Sign up for a weekly roundup of thought-provoking ideas and debates
In 2014, U.S. officials imposed a moratorium on experiments to enhance some of the world’s most lethal viruses by making them transmissible by air, responding to widespread concerns that a lab accident could spark a global pandemic. Most infectious-disease studies pose modest safety risks, but given that these proposed experiments intended to create a highly contagious flu virus that could spread among humans, the government concluded the work should not go on until it could be approved through a specially created, rigorous review process that considered the dangers.
Apparently, the government has decided the research should now move ahead. In the past year, the U.S. government quietly greenlighted funding for two groups of researchers, one in the United States and the other in the Netherlands, to conduct transmission-enhancing experiments on the bird flu virus as they were originally proposed before the moratorium. Amazingly, despite the potential public-health consequences of such work, neither the approval nor the deliberations or judgments that supported it were announced publicly. The government confirmed them only when a reporter learned about them through non-official channels.
This lack of transparency is unacceptable. Making decisions to approve potentially dangerous research in secret betrays the government’s responsibility to inform and involve the public when approving endeavors, whether scientific or otherwise, that could put health and lives at risk.
We are two of the hundreds of researchers, medical and public-health professionals, and others who publicly opposed these experiments when they were first announced. In response to these concerns, the government issued a framework in 2017 for special review of “enhanced” pathogens that could become capable of causing a pandemic. Under that framework, reviewers must consider the purported benefits and the potential risks and, before approving the work, determine “that the potential risks as compared to the potential benefits to society are justified.”
The framework also requires that experts in public-health preparedness and response, biosafety, ethics and law, among others, evaluate the work, but it is unclear from the public record if that happened. No description of who reviewed these proposals has been provided. It is not stated what evidence was considered, how competing claims were evaluated or whether there were potential conflicts of interest.
This secrecy means we don’t know how these requirements were applied, if at all, to the experiments now funded by the government. A spokesperson from the Department of Health and Human Services told Science magazine that the agency cannot make the reviews public because doing so might reveal proprietary information about the applicants’ plans that could help their competitors. This bureaucratic logic implies that it is more important to maintain the trade secrets of a few prominent scientists than to let citizens — who bear the risk if an accident happens and who fund their work — scrutinize the decisions of public officials about whether these studies are worth the risk.
As researchers, we understand the usual logic for keeping scientific grant reviews confidential. But this is not ordinary science. The overwhelming majority of scientific studies are safe; even the worst imaginable accident, such as an infection of a lab worker or an explosion, is unlikely and would harm only a handful of people. But creating potentially pandemic pathogens creates a risk — albeit a small one — of infecting millions of people with a highly dangerous virus. For this kind of research, there is no justification for keeping risk-benefit deliberations secret.
Waiving confidentiality when lives are at stake is a standard practice. Health-care providers must report if their patients present an imminent threat to themselves or others, and drugmakers must disclose many facts about their products before approval in service of protecting public health and safety.
We have serious doubts about whether these experiments should be conducted at all. We also suspect that few members of the public would find compelling the rationale that the best way to fight the flu is to create the most contagious, lethal virus possible in a lab. But with deliberations kept behind closed doors, none of us will have the opportunity to understand how the government arrived at these decisions or to judge the rigor and integrity of that process.
Ultimately, public awareness is not enough. The debate in the United States over the past five years took place mainly among a small group of scientists and made only token efforts to inform or engage the wider citizenry. We need public discussion and debate about the risks and benefits of these kinds of experiments. And because viruses do not respect borders, the conversation must move beyond the national level, to coordinate the regulation of dangerous science internationally.
At stake here is the credibility of science, which depends on public support to continue. Science is a powerful driver of human health, well-being and prosperity, and nearly all of it can be done without putting populations at risk. If governments want to fund exceptionally risky science, they should do so openly and in a way that promotes public awareness and engagement.
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我的叔叔于勒
- 著名点评
我的叔叔于勒 的博客 - 帖子互动： 108
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Re: 独家：有争议的美国科学家为大流行研究创造了致命的新流感毒株, 科学家们对创造一种可能使人类免疫系统失去防御能力的病毒表示恐惧
这个日本的逼和高福 八鲤氪全部是一伙的 都在2014年的GOF会议上发言