冷眼旁观2024年美国大选
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左也行，右也行，文明发帖就欢迎；粉也罢，黑也罢，互相尊重别谩骂。
左也行，右也行，文明发帖就欢迎；粉也罢，黑也罢，互相尊重别谩骂。
#63 Re: 冷眼旁观2024年美国大选
For the future of your kids, vote out ALL the old fucks! The young generation needs to take the power!
#65 Re: 冷眼旁观2024年美国大选
ilovemynight 写了： 2024年 8月 3日 15:07 For the future of your kids, vote out ALL the old fucks! The young generation needs to take the power!
#69 Re: 冷眼旁观2024年美国大选
https://www.ft.com/content/75667fb1-1dc ... 90c8f04b87
An election typically features political parties putting forward candidates and platforms that they expect will win support, each striving to earn a popular mandate for its governing vision. But the scrambling of political coalitions in western democracies is confounding this process. In Britain, the Tories have spent the past several years driving their own voters away. In France, while the centre and left forfeited contests to each other, they lack shared goals beyond beating the right.
The US, with its two-party system, is particularly perplexing. One party’s failing should be the other’s opportunity. Yet both have seemed determined for nearly a decade to remain unpopular, and the 2024 election is proving the strangest contest of all. With President Joe Biden, a Democrat, earning record low approval ratings, Republicans chose to nominate Donald Trump, who couldn’t reach 47 per cent of the vote in either of the prior two elections.
Momentum swung in Trump’s direction early in the summer, not because of any strategic choices or effective campaigning, but because of Biden’s incompetence and an assassin’s narrow miss. When Biden dropped out and vice-president Kamala Harris was anointed in his place, the pendulum swung back, not because of any strategic choices or effective campaigning, but because she was not Trump or Biden. Republicans consider Harris an unqualified diversity hire, but their own candidate cannot get to 48 per cent against her. Democrats consider Trump a dangerous conman, but their own candidate cannot get to 48 per cent against him.
Beyond the candidates’ shortcomings, both parties face the fundamental problem that their political elites are pulling them away from the voters they need to add to their coalitions.
Reduced to simplest terms, most Americans have not earned a college degree, and Republicans have tended to represent their social and cultural views while ignoring their economic concerns. Democrats have tended to do the opposite. Either party, by attending more closely to the interests of working-class voters, has had a path to a durable governing majority. Yet Republican elites continue to demand economic policies that primarily benefit Wall Street. Democratic elites continue to push the progressive priorities of campus activists.
The nominees for vice-president both cast the challenge in stark relief.
In selecting Ohio senator JD Vance as running mate, Trump was opening the door to more fully embracing Vance’s brand of conservative economics, with the potential to solidify a governing majority on a foundation of broad working-class support. “We’re done catering to Wall Street,” Vance said in his speech. “We’ll commit to the working man.” The next night, Trump delivered a meandering address that succeeded only in assuring the American people he had not changed. The weeks since have been a blur of unfocused attacks lacking any sense of message or vision.
Some have tried to interpret Harris’s choice of Minnesota governor Tim Walz, a folksy-seeming Midwesterner, as an indication that she recognises the need to moderate her own image as a radical progressive. But his own record is quite similar to Harris’s, and he seems more interested in playing the role of culture warrior than returning the Democratic party’s focus to working-class concerns.
His introductory speech on Tuesday in Philadelphia featured no mention at all of economic conditions or creating good jobs. He hit reproductive freedom, gun control, student debt, the environment and entitlements. He mocked Vance for attending Yale, calling him “creepy” and “weird”.
The opportunity, for both parties, remains. But it is harder to see the Democrats seizing it. After Biden, Harris seems a step in every wrong direction. At least under Trump the Republican party has made some moves towards workers’ interests. It has become more sceptical of globalisation and trade with China, more committed to US manufacturing, more eager to support families raising children, even more open to organised labour. Working-class voters have shifted to the right, and Trump has improved the party’s standing with non-white voters in particular.
To strengthen his coalition, Trump could focus on trade, where he is particularly strong, and make the case for reindustrialising the American economy. He could emphasise that immigration enforcement can tighten labour markets and boost wages. He could confront the university system’s failures and pledge to fund apprenticeships instead. He could build his vague “baby bonus” into a real plan for families. On all these fronts, Vance has already shown leadership in the Senate and could provide robust reinforcement.
Unfortunately, to borrow Harris’s formulation, such a strategy is “what can be, unburdened by what has been”. Nothing precludes it, but Trump’s campaign history speaks poorly of its plausibility. Without it, he remains vulnerable to a Harris-Walz ticket that finds its own footing, though that seems not much more likely. On the current trajectory, each side’s argument will remain that it is not the other guy, culminating in another narrow victory for someone providing no mandate for anything. The better path will still be there, waiting to be taken.
An election typically features political parties putting forward candidates and platforms that they expect will win support, each striving to earn a popular mandate for its governing vision. But the scrambling of political coalitions in western democracies is confounding this process. In Britain, the Tories have spent the past several years driving their own voters away. In France, while the centre and left forfeited contests to each other, they lack shared goals beyond beating the right.
The US, with its two-party system, is particularly perplexing. One party’s failing should be the other’s opportunity. Yet both have seemed determined for nearly a decade to remain unpopular, and the 2024 election is proving the strangest contest of all. With President Joe Biden, a Democrat, earning record low approval ratings, Republicans chose to nominate Donald Trump, who couldn’t reach 47 per cent of the vote in either of the prior two elections.
Momentum swung in Trump’s direction early in the summer, not because of any strategic choices or effective campaigning, but because of Biden’s incompetence and an assassin’s narrow miss. When Biden dropped out and vice-president Kamala Harris was anointed in his place, the pendulum swung back, not because of any strategic choices or effective campaigning, but because she was not Trump or Biden. Republicans consider Harris an unqualified diversity hire, but their own candidate cannot get to 48 per cent against her. Democrats consider Trump a dangerous conman, but their own candidate cannot get to 48 per cent against him.
Beyond the candidates’ shortcomings, both parties face the fundamental problem that their political elites are pulling them away from the voters they need to add to their coalitions.
Reduced to simplest terms, most Americans have not earned a college degree, and Republicans have tended to represent their social and cultural views while ignoring their economic concerns. Democrats have tended to do the opposite. Either party, by attending more closely to the interests of working-class voters, has had a path to a durable governing majority. Yet Republican elites continue to demand economic policies that primarily benefit Wall Street. Democratic elites continue to push the progressive priorities of campus activists.
The nominees for vice-president both cast the challenge in stark relief.
In selecting Ohio senator JD Vance as running mate, Trump was opening the door to more fully embracing Vance’s brand of conservative economics, with the potential to solidify a governing majority on a foundation of broad working-class support. “We’re done catering to Wall Street,” Vance said in his speech. “We’ll commit to the working man.” The next night, Trump delivered a meandering address that succeeded only in assuring the American people he had not changed. The weeks since have been a blur of unfocused attacks lacking any sense of message or vision.
Some have tried to interpret Harris’s choice of Minnesota governor Tim Walz, a folksy-seeming Midwesterner, as an indication that she recognises the need to moderate her own image as a radical progressive. But his own record is quite similar to Harris’s, and he seems more interested in playing the role of culture warrior than returning the Democratic party’s focus to working-class concerns.
His introductory speech on Tuesday in Philadelphia featured no mention at all of economic conditions or creating good jobs. He hit reproductive freedom, gun control, student debt, the environment and entitlements. He mocked Vance for attending Yale, calling him “creepy” and “weird”.
The opportunity, for both parties, remains. But it is harder to see the Democrats seizing it. After Biden, Harris seems a step in every wrong direction. At least under Trump the Republican party has made some moves towards workers’ interests. It has become more sceptical of globalisation and trade with China, more committed to US manufacturing, more eager to support families raising children, even more open to organised labour. Working-class voters have shifted to the right, and Trump has improved the party’s standing with non-white voters in particular.
To strengthen his coalition, Trump could focus on trade, where he is particularly strong, and make the case for reindustrialising the American economy. He could emphasise that immigration enforcement can tighten labour markets and boost wages. He could confront the university system’s failures and pledge to fund apprenticeships instead. He could build his vague “baby bonus” into a real plan for families. On all these fronts, Vance has already shown leadership in the Senate and could provide robust reinforcement.
Unfortunately, to borrow Harris’s formulation, such a strategy is “what can be, unburdened by what has been”. Nothing precludes it, but Trump’s campaign history speaks poorly of its plausibility. Without it, he remains vulnerable to a Harris-Walz ticket that finds its own footing, though that seems not much more likely. On the current trajectory, each side’s argument will remain that it is not the other guy, culminating in another narrow victory for someone providing no mandate for anything. The better path will still be there, waiting to be taken.
#70 Re: 冷眼旁观2024年美国大选
Senator JD Vance on "Face the Nation" | full interview
真关心美国政治的，应该看看这个视频，很多common sense policy
Vance 前途无量，将来非常有可能成为美国总统。
各位喜欢人身攻击的就省省吧。连Trump 和Harris 人品这么差的人都能成为正式候选人甚至成为总统，Vance比起来简直就是纯洁的小白兔。
真关心美国政治的，应该看看这个视频，很多common sense policy
Vance 前途无量，将来非常有可能成为美国总统。
各位喜欢人身攻击的就省省吧。连Trump 和Harris 人品这么差的人都能成为正式候选人甚至成为总统，Vance比起来简直就是纯洁的小白兔。
#71 Re: 冷眼旁观2024年美国大选
其中一个是给在家看孩子的grandparents/parents tax credit, 这是个非常好的政策。现在很多孩子的健康包括精神健康问题，跟不是自己亲人照看有关，尤其是妈妈，妈妈带的孩子最健康。
ilovemynight 写了： 2024年 8月 11日 17:05 Senator JD Vance on "Face the Nation" | full interview
真关心美国政治的，应该看看这个视频，很多common sense policy
Vance 前途无量，将来非常有可能成为美国总统。
各位喜欢人身攻击的就省省吧。连Trump 和Harris 人品这么差的人都能成为正式候选人甚至成为总统，Vance比起来简直就是纯洁的小白兔。
#73 Re: 冷眼旁观2024年美国大选
对，还有一个是要除消child credits的收入限制。ilovemynight 写了： 2024年 8月 11日 17:11 其中一个是给在家看孩子的grandparents/parents tax credit, 这是个非常好的政策。现在很多孩子的健康包括精神健康问题，跟不是自己亲人照看有关，尤其是妈妈，妈妈带的孩子最健康。
正在听他的书。在这个年龄写岀这样的书也很不简单。
