俄对美德英波法乌等的战争之Bakhmut战，和其它，和然后，和中国，和宇宙

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BEIJING, March 28 (Reuters) - Chinese national oil company CNOOC 0883.HK, 600938.SS and France's TotalEnergies TTEF.PA have completed China's first yuan-settled LNG trade through the Shanghai Petroleum and Natural Gas Exchange, the exchange said on Tuesday.

Approximately 65,000 tonnes of LNG imported from the UAE changed hands in the trade, it said in a statement.

TotalEnergies confirmed to Reuters that the transaction involved LNG imported from the UAE but did not comment further.

https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/china-c ... -lng-trade

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Strengthened the Armed Forces of Ukraine in front of Vodyany.
At the intersection with the M-30 highway.
review, as usual, Filatov's video.
two lined abandoned our infantry fighting vehicles and T-72B.
48°05'09.3"N 37°40'00.9"E

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Liquidation of Russian security guards of the "Storm"

Regular night work of Mykolaiv Marines 36 OBrMP and 503 OBMP

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“we are ready”？？？？？？？？？

for how long had you been not ready？

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Russia has increased gas supplies to Hungary at the request of the leadership of this country, according to the results of a conversation between Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak and Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto.

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The units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine deployed in the Kupyansk direction use agricultural vehicles for cover to transport ammunition, retired Lieutenant Colonel of the People's Militia of the LPR Andrey Marochko told us.

Earlier, Marochko told our agency that additional engineering units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces arrived at the Kupyansk sector of the front to help the soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in mining the area and equipping new positions along the Oskol River.

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Russian Foreign Ministry: Russia does not rule out that sabotage groups will be transferred to Belarus from Ukraine, wishing to overthrow the leadership of the republic.

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之前转发了昨天进入俄国的坑敌小队发的视频。

The Russian military destroyed one of the vehicles on which Ukrainian saboteurs tried to break into the Bryansk region . The second pickup managed to escape.

According to preliminary data, 8 militants were eliminated.

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https://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/WPS12 ... Resort.pdf

China as an International Lender of Last Resort

Abstract
This paper shows that China has created a new global system for cross-border rescue lending to countries in distress. We build a comprehensive new dataset on China’s overseas bailouts between 2000 and 2021 and come to surprising new insights. Most importantly, we find that the People’s Bank of China’s (PBOC) global swap line network has been heavily used as a financial rescue mechanism, with more than USD 170 billion in emergency liquidity support to crisis countries. In addition, we document that Chinese state-owned banks and enterprises have extended an additional USD 70 billion in rescue loans for balance of payments support. In total, China’s overseas bailouts correspond to more than 20% of total IMF lending over the past decade and bailout amounts are growing fast. However, China’s rescue loans differ from those of established international lenders of last resort in that they (i) are opaque, (ii) have relatively high interest rates, and (iii) are almost exclusively targeted to debtors of China's Belt and Road Initiative. Our results have implications for the international financial and monetary system, which is becoming more multipolar, less institutionalized, and less transparent.

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from the above paper：
Thus, a main insight is that China’s swap line network has become an important tool of overseas
crisis management. In total, we find that 170 billion USD have been extended by the PBOC to
central banks of countries in financial or macroeconomic distress. This amount involves a large
number of rollovers, as short-term PBOC swap loans are often extended again and again,
resulting in a de facto maturity of more than three years, on average.
To supplement our new data on swap line drawings, we also track balance of payments support
(bridge loans) from Chinese state-owned policy banks, state-owned commercial banks, and
state-owned enterprises to EMDE central banks and governments. We identify more than 70
rescue loans to 13 different EMDEs worth of 70 billion USD. These loans are mostly USDdenominated and they often explicitly allow borrowers to use the funds to repay existing debts,
including those owed to Chinese institutions. We also track commodity prepayment facilities
through which Chinese state-owned oil and gas companies (like CNPC and UNIPEC) provide
large cash advances for commodity imports.
In total, more than 20 debtor countries have received 240 billion USD in Chinese rescue lending
since 2000. The scale of China’s global bailout lending program is also growing fast. More than
185 billion USD was extended in the past five years alone (2016-2021).
We therefore find that China has emerged as a key lender of last resort for a growing number
of developing countries. However, its role in the international financial system is less central,
by far, than that of the established global lenders of last resort (Fisher 1999; Reinhart and
Trebesch 2016). China’s bailouts are small compared to the IMF’s global lending portfolio and
dwarfed by the sweeping international USD liquidity support extended by the U.S. Federal
Reserve (Fed) since 2007, primarily to advanced economies.
4 We also find that Beijing has
targeted a limited set of potential recipients, as almost all Chinese rescue loans have gone to
low- and middle-income BRI countries with significant debts outstanding to Chinese banks.
In sum, China has developed a system of “Bailouts on the Belt and Road” that helps recipient
countries to avoid default, and continue servicing their BRI debts, at least in the short run.
China’s role as an international crisis manager can therefore be compared to that of the US
Treasury during previous Latin American debt crises or to a regional financial institution like
the European Stability Mechanism, which helped to avert, delay, or resolve defaults by highly
indebted borrowers, rather than to a global financial backstop with “deep pockets” (Rogoff
1999, Scheubel and Stracca 2019, Mitchener and Trebesch 2022, Reinhart 2022, Roldan and
Sosa-Padilla 2023).

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5. Conclusion
In this paper, we show that China’s role as an international crisis manager has grown
exponentially in recent years following its long boom in overseas lending. Its position is still
far from rivaling that of the United States or the IMF, which are at the center of today’s
international financial and monetary system and the effectiveness of its rescue lending
operations is not well understood. However, we see historical parallels to the era when the US
started its rise as a global financial power, especially in the 1930s and after World War 2, when
it used the US Ex-Im Bank, the US Exchange Stabilization Fund and the Fed to provide rescue
funds to countries with large liabilities to US banks and exporters (Bitterman 1973, Bordo and
Schwartz 2001, Horn et al. 2020). Over time, these ad hoc activities by the US developed into
a tested system of global crisis management, a path that China may possibly pursue as well.
Our findings have major implications for the evolution of the international financial system, as
cross-border rescue operations become less institutionalized, less transparent, and more
piecemeal. China has demonstrated that a major creditor country (notwithstanding its current
status as an emerging market) can create a large system of cross-border rescue lending to nearly
two dozen recipient countries, while at the same time keeping its bailout operations largely out
of public sight. Much more research is needed to measure the impacts of China’s rescue loans,
in particular the large swap lines administered by the PBOC so as to gauge the full extent of
debt distress in EMDEs and recalibrate what we understand as the global financial architecture.

This paper offers a first attempt to understand how rising creditor powers outside the traditional
Paris Club creditors (China, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, or Russia) use central
banks and other state-controlled institutions to channel rescue loans in opaque ways. These
developments may indeed foreshadow a deeper shift towards a more multipolar and fragmented
international financial architecture.

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Voenkor Marat Khairullin on the situation in the Artemov direction:

The movement of our fighters in the city is approximately three to eight houses per day. Now there are fights in high-rise buildings. We use an interesting tactic: if the enemy rested in one place, ours quickly reorganize and after 2-3 hours they strike in another place . Powerful sniper groups work day and night. The AFU has horrendous losses, they are in a panic. There are regular tantrums in the personnel.

In the morning, our military occupied the administration of the district. There is movement from the central market. Inside Artyomovsk, a sack is outlined within a sack. In the park area between Independence Street and Bakhmutka, the enemy has a fortified area. Now he is almost surrounded by our fighters.