Breaking!复旦副院长冯玉军在The Economist长文:俄罗斯必败

[jungle]

The Economist 是英美帝国主义的人民日报，对每周大事定政治基调。
之前都是自己staff写的不记名文章，这两年每期有两三篇by invitation的外来署名文章。
最新一期经济学家里有一篇，冯玉军论俄乌战争和中俄关系。

冯玉军，复旦大学国际问题研究院副院长，俄罗斯中亚研究中心主任，教授，博士生导师。曾任中国现代国际关系研究院俄罗斯研究所所长、研究员、博士生导师、院学术委员。中国中俄关系史研究会副秘书长，中国俄罗斯东欧中亚学会、中国上海合作组织研究中心、中俄友协常务理事。
https://brgg.fudan.edu.cn/teaminfo_14.html

By Invitation | A Chinese view of Russia
Russia is sure to lose in Ukraine, reckons a Chinese expert on Russia
Feng Yujun says the war has strained Sino-Russian relations
Apr 11th 2024

THE WAR between Russia and Ukraine has been catastrophic for both countries. With neither side enjoying an overwhelming advantage and their political positions completely at odds, the fighting is unlikely to end soon. One thing is clear, though: the conflict is a post-cold-war watershed that will have a profound, lasting global impact.

Four main factors will influence the course of the war. The first is the level of resistance and national unity shown by Ukrainians, which has until now been extraordinary. The second is international support for Ukraine, which, though recently falling short of the country’s expectations, remains broad.

The third factor is the nature of modern warfare, a contest that turns on a combination of industrial might and command, control, communications and intelligence systems. One reason Russia has struggled in this war is that it is yet to recover from the dramatic deindustrialisation it suffered after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The final factor is information. When it comes to decision-making, Vladimir Putin is trapped in an information cocoon, thanks to his having been in power so long. The Russian president and his national-security team lack access to accurate intelligence. The system they operate lacks an efficient mechanism for correcting errors. Their Ukrainian counterparts are more flexible and effective.

In combination, these four factors make Russia’s eventual defeat inevitable. In time it will be forced to withdraw from all occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea. Its nuclear capability is no guarantee of success. Didn’t a nuclear-armed America withdraw from Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan?

Though the war has been hugely costly for Ukraine, the strength and unity of its resistance has shattered the myth that Russia is militarily invincible. Ukraine may yet rise from the ashes. When the war ends, it can look forward to the possibility of joining the European Union and NATO.

The war is a turning-point for Russia. It has consigned Mr Putin’s regime to broad international isolation. He has also had to deal with difficult domestic political undercurrents, from the rebellion by the mercenaries of the Wagner Group and other pockets of the military—for instance in Belgorod—to ethnic tensions in several Russian regions and the recent terrorist attack in Moscow. These show that political risk in Russia is very high. Mr Putin may recently have been re-elected, but he faces all kinds of possible black-swan events.

Adding to the risks confronting Mr Putin, the war has convinced more and more former Soviet republics that Russia’s imperial ambition threatens their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Increasingly aware that a Russian victory is out of the question, these states are distancing themselves from Moscow in different ways, from forging economic-development policies that are less dependent on Russia to pursuing more balanced foreign policies. As a result, prospects for the Eurasian integration that Russia advocates have dimmed.

The war, meanwhile, has made Europe wake up to the enormous threat that Russia’s military aggression poses to the continent’s security and the international order, bringing post-cold-war EU-Russia detente to an end. Many European countries have given up their illusions about Mr Putin’s Russia.

At the same time, the war has jolted NATO out of what Emmanuel Macron, the French president, called its “brain-dead” state. With most NATO countries increasing their military spending, the alliance’s forward military deployment in eastern Europe has been greatly shored up. The addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO highlights Mr Putin’s inability to use the war to prevent the alliance’s expansion.

The war will also help to reshape the UN Security Council. It has highlighted the body’s inability to effectively assume its responsibility of maintaining world peace and regional security owing to the abuse of veto power by some permanent members. This has riled the international community, increasing the chances that reform of the Security Council will speed up. Germany, Japan, India and other countries are likely to become permanent members and the five current permanent members may lose their veto power. Without reform, the paralysis that has become the hallmark of the Security Council will lead the world to an even more dangerous place.

China’s relations with Russia are not fixed, and they have been affected by the events of the past two years. Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, has just visited Beijing, where he and his Chinese counterpart once again emphasised the close ties between their countries. But the trip appears to have been more diplomatic effort by Russia to show it is not alone than genuine love-in. Shrewd observers note that China’s stance towards Russia has reverted from the “no limits” stance of early 2022, before the war, to the traditional principles of “non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-targeting of third parties”.

Although China has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, it has not systematically violated them. It is true that China imported more than 100m tonnes of Russian oil in 2023, but that is not a great deal more than it was buying annually before the war. If China stops importing Russian oil and instead buys from elsewhere, it will undoubtedly push up international oil prices, putting huge pressure on the world economy.

Since the war began China has conducted two rounds of diplomatic mediation. Success has proved elusive but no one should doubt China’s desire to end this cruel war through negotiations. That wish shows that China and Russia are very different countries. Russia is seeking to subvert the existing international and regional order by means of war, whereas China wants to resolve disputes peacefully.

With Russia still attacking Ukrainian military positions, critical infrastructure and cities, and possibly willing to escalate further, the chances of a Korea-style armistice look remote. In the absence of a fundamental change in Russia’s political system and ideology, the conflict could become frozen. That would only allow Russia to continue to launch new wars after a respite, putting the world in even greater danger.
https://www.economist.com/by-invitation ... -on-russia

[hhcare]

河北大学

估计没有人知道在哪个城市

[Fcukya]

河北大学

[司马脱]

复旦复杂决策研究中心一开战也是这个调调，well,

俄罗斯虽然已经越过其扩张的顶点，但它在对西方谈判中能够利用比自身大得多的筹码，而获得超越自身能力的收益，普京所处的谈判位置，就是当年毛泽东主席所处的谈判位置。

[shengwei]

以前天津属于河北

[jungle]

中国俄罗斯问题专家认为俄罗斯在乌克兰肯定会失败
冯玉军称战争使中俄关系紧张
2024 年 4 月 11 日

俄罗斯和乌克兰之间的战争对两国来说都是灾难性的。 由于双方都不具有压倒性优势，且政治立场完全不一致，战斗不太可能很快结束。 但有一点是明确的：这场冲突是冷战后的一个分水岭，将对全球产生深远、持久的影响。

有四个主要因素将影响战争的进程。 首先是乌克兰人表现出的抵抗和民族团结的程度，迄今为止这都是非同寻常的。 第二个是国际社会对乌克兰的支持，虽然最近没有达到该国的期望，但仍然广泛。

第三个因素是现代战争的性质，这是一场将工业力量与指挥、控制、通信和情报系统结合起来的竞赛。 俄罗斯在这场战争中举步维艰的原因之一是，它尚未从苏联解体后遭受的剧烈去工业化中恢复过来。

最后一个因素是信息。 在决策方面，弗拉基米尔·普京（Vladimir Putin）由于执政时间太长而陷入信息茧中。 俄罗斯总统和他的国家安全团队无法获得准确的情报。 他们所运行的系统缺乏有效的纠正错误的机制。 乌克兰同行更加灵活和有效。

这四个因素综合起来，使得俄罗斯最终的失败不可避免。 随着时间的推移，它将被迫从包括克里米亚在内的所有被占领的乌克兰领土上撤出。 它的核能力并不能保证成功。 拥有核武器的美国不是从朝鲜、越南和阿富汗撤军了吗？

尽管乌克兰在这场战争中付出了巨大代价，但其抵抗的力量和团结打破了俄罗斯在军事上所向无敌的神话。 乌克兰仍有可能从废墟中复活。 战争结束后，它可以期待加入欧盟和北约的可能性。

这场战争对于俄罗斯来说是一个转折点。 它使普京政权受到广泛的国际孤立。 他还必须应对困难的国内政治暗流，从瓦格纳集团雇佣军和其他军队（例如别尔哥罗德）的叛乱，到俄罗斯几个地区的种族紧张局势以及最近在莫斯科发生的恐怖袭击。 这些都表明俄罗斯的政治风险非常高。 普京最近可能再次当选，但他面临着各种可能的黑天鹅事件。

这场战争让越来越多的前苏联加盟共和国相信，俄罗斯的帝国野心威胁着它们的独立、主权和领土完整，这加剧了普京面临的风险。 这些国家越来越意识到俄罗斯不可能获胜，因此正在以不同的方式与莫斯科保持距离，从制定减少对俄罗斯依赖的经济发展政策到追求更加平衡的外交政策。 俄罗斯倡导的欧亚一体化前景因此变得黯淡。

与此同时，这场战争让欧洲意识到俄罗斯的军事侵略对欧洲大陆安全和国际秩序构成的巨大威胁，结束了冷战后欧盟与俄罗斯的缓和。 许多欧洲国家已经放弃了对普京领导下的俄罗斯的幻想。

与此同时，战争使北约摆脱了法国总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙所说的“脑死亡”状态。 随着大多数北约国家军费开支的增加，北约在东欧的前沿军事部署得到了极大的支撑。 瑞典和芬兰加入北约凸显了普京无法利用战争来阻止联盟扩张。

这场战争还将有助于重塑联合国安理会。 这凸显了由于一些常任理事国滥用否决权，该机构无法有效承担维护世界和平和地区安全的责任。 这激怒了国际社会，增加了安理会改革加速的可能性。 德国、日本、印度等国很可能成为常任理事国，现任五个常任理事国可能会失去否决权。 如果不进行改革，安理会的瘫痪将导致世界走向更加危险的境地。

中俄关系并不固定，而且受到近两年事件的影响。 俄罗斯外长拉夫罗夫刚刚访问北京，他和中国外长再次强调了两国之间的密切关系。 但这次访问似乎更多是俄罗斯的外交努力，以表明它并不孤单，而不是真正的爱意。 精明的观察家指出，中国对俄罗斯的立场已从2022年初战前的“无限制”立场恢复到“不结盟、不对抗、不针对第三方”的传统原则。

尽管中国没有加入西方对俄罗斯的制裁，但也没有系统性违反这些制裁。 确实，2023年中国进口了超过1亿吨俄罗斯石油，但这并不比战前每年购买的石油多得多。 如果中国停止进口俄罗斯石油，转而从其他地方购买石油，无疑将推高国际油价，给世界经济带来巨大压力。

战争爆发以来，中国已进行了两轮外交斡旋。 事实证明，成功是难以捉摸的，但任何人都不应该怀疑中国通过谈判结束这场残酷战争的愿望。 这一愿望表明中国和俄罗斯是非常不同的国家。 俄罗斯寻求通过战争颠覆现有国际和地区秩序，而中国则希望和平解决争端。

由于俄罗斯仍在攻击乌克兰的军事阵地、关键基础设施和城市，并且可能愿意进一步升级，朝鲜式停战的可能性看起来微乎其微。 如果俄罗斯的政治制度和意识形态没有发生根本性的改变，冲突可能会被冻结。 这只会让俄罗斯在喘息之后继续发动新的战争，让世界陷入更大的危险。

[chinav5]

河北大概是最多太监和汉奸的省。

河北大学

估计没有人知道在哪个城市

[wokao]

跟河南大学一样，都是在曾经的省会

河北大学

估计没有人知道在哪个城市

[_notalandlord]

这头傻逼是号称研究日本的那个吧？书10年前就发现这是头猪。

麻痹复旦真是藏污纳垢之所。

[lasa]

这就是chatgpt水平吧
哪一句话西方新闻里没有？专家也太好当了

[chinav5]

其实这是阳谋。

中国眼看美国在俄乌战争要打退堂鼓，派人过来鼓舞来了。

这八成是阴阳人三朝国师王某人策划的。跟我前些时候在买提发的帖子观点不谋而合。

[jungle]

这就是chatgpt水平吧
哪一句话西方新闻里没有？专家也太好当了

冯的位置挺重要的吧，俄罗斯中亚研究中心主任。
他这么写，是代表我国官方意见，还只是他自己是英美的狗腿子？

[yuzhou]

四个理由越说越糊涂

[gooder]

Economist 受共产邪灵附体。

否则，应该请国师张维为写。张是习近平的国师，王妇宁的饼头

[chinav5]

当然代表王国师的意见。他相当于王的白手套。

所以也是官方的意见。

这种千载难逢的，长袖善舞的机会不把握住，那作为三朝国师就会言过其实。

不过无心甚慰，甚慰吴心。

冯的位置挺重要的吧，俄罗斯中亚研究中心主任。
他这么写，是代表我国官方意见，还只是他自己是英美的狗腿子？

[长廊夜话]

这明显是党放出来的风声，想要逃离俄罗斯的破船了，也想撇清自己前面对俄的支持，细品一下最后一段。国内的学者没有党的授意敢自己在外面发表文章表达支持乌克兰的观点？
但是习本身是非常亲俄的，看他会不会拉着全中国去填俄罗斯这个大窟窿了。

[trleste]

这明显是党放出来的风声，想要逃离俄罗斯的破船了，也想撇清自己前面对俄的支持，细品一下最后一段。国内的学者没有党的授意敢自己在外面发表文章表达支持乌克兰的观点？
但是习本身是非常亲俄的，看他会不会拉着全中国去填俄罗斯这个大窟窿了。

别尼玛意淫了

就一老逼将给请去拉个场子而已

毛子已经赢定了

傻逼才看不出来

[gooder]

楼上的几人明显想当然。
中共国现在走的路，行的事明显和张维为一条裤子。

这个姓冯的像是西方“间谍”

[wanmeishijie]

河北大学

估计没有人知道在哪个城市

保定市

[赖美豪中]

北约都去军事化了，如果鹅毛再胜下去，白宫就该挂镰刀斧头了把

The Economist 是英美帝国主义的人民日报，对每周大事定政治基调。
之前都是自己staff写的不记名文章，这两年每期有两三篇by invitation的外来署名文章。
最新一期经济学家里有一篇，冯玉军论俄乌战争和中俄关系。

冯玉军，复旦大学国际问题研究院副院长，俄罗斯中亚研究中心主任，教授，博士生导师。曾任中国现代国际关系研究院俄罗斯研究所所长、研究员、博士生导师、院学术委员。中国中俄关系史研究会副秘书长，中国俄罗斯东欧中亚学会、中国上海合作组织研究中心、中俄友协常务理事。
https://brgg.fudan.edu.cn/teaminfo_14.html

By Invitation | A Chinese view of Russia
Russia is sure to lose in Ukraine, reckons a Chinese expert on Russia
Feng Yujun says the war has strained Sino-Russian relations
Apr 11th 2024

THE WAR between Russia and Ukraine has been catastrophic for both countries. With neither side enjoying an overwhelming advantage and their political positions completely at odds, the fighting is unlikely to end soon. One thing is clear, though: the conflict is a post-cold-war watershed that will have a profound, lasting global impact.

Four main factors will influence the course of the war. The first is the level of resistance and national unity shown by Ukrainians, which has until now been extraordinary. The second is international support for Ukraine, which, though recently falling short of the country’s expectations, remains broad.

The third factor is the nature of modern warfare, a contest that turns on a combination of industrial might and command, control, communications and intelligence systems. One reason Russia has struggled in this war is that it is yet to recover from the dramatic deindustrialisation it suffered after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The final factor is information. When it comes to decision-making, Vladimir Putin is trapped in an information cocoon, thanks to his having been in power so long. The Russian president and his national-security team lack access to accurate intelligence. The system they operate lacks an efficient mechanism for correcting errors. Their Ukrainian counterparts are more flexible and effective.

In combination, these four factors make Russia’s eventual defeat inevitable. In time it will be forced to withdraw from all occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea. Its nuclear capability is no guarantee of success. Didn’t a nuclear-armed America withdraw from Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan?

Though the war has been hugely costly for Ukraine, the strength and unity of its resistance has shattered the myth that Russia is militarily invincible. Ukraine may yet rise from the ashes. When the war ends, it can look forward to the possibility of joining the European Union and NATO.

The war is a turning-point for Russia. It has consigned Mr Putin’s regime to broad international isolation. He has also had to deal with difficult domestic political undercurrents, from the rebellion by the mercenaries of the Wagner Group and other pockets of the military—for instance in Belgorod—to ethnic tensions in several Russian regions and the recent terrorist attack in Moscow. These show that political risk in Russia is very high. Mr Putin may recently have been re-elected, but he faces all kinds of possible black-swan events.

Adding to the risks confronting Mr Putin, the war has convinced more and more former Soviet republics that Russia’s imperial ambition threatens their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Increasingly aware that a Russian victory is out of the question, these states are distancing themselves from Moscow in different ways, from forging economic-development policies that are less dependent on Russia to pursuing more balanced foreign policies. As a result, prospects for the Eurasian integration that Russia advocates have dimmed.

The war, meanwhile, has made Europe wake up to the enormous threat that Russia’s military aggression poses to the continent’s security and the international order, bringing post-cold-war EU-Russia detente to an end. Many European countries have given up their illusions about Mr Putin’s Russia.

At the same time, the war has jolted NATO out of what Emmanuel Macron, the French president, called its “brain-dead” state. With most NATO countries increasing their military spending, the alliance’s forward military deployment in eastern Europe has been greatly shored up. The addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO highlights Mr Putin’s inability to use the war to prevent the alliance’s expansion.

The war will also help to reshape the UN Security Council. It has highlighted the body’s inability to effectively assume its responsibility of maintaining world peace and regional security owing to the abuse of veto power by some permanent members. This has riled the international community, increasing the chances that reform of the Security Council will speed up. Germany, Japan, India and other countries are likely to become permanent members and the five current permanent members may lose their veto power. Without reform, the paralysis that has become the hallmark of the Security Council will lead the world to an even more dangerous place.

China’s relations with Russia are not fixed, and they have been affected by the events of the past two years. Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, has just visited Beijing, where he and his Chinese counterpart once again emphasised the close ties between their countries. But the trip appears to have been more diplomatic effort by Russia to show it is not alone than genuine love-in. Shrewd observers note that China’s stance towards Russia has reverted from the “no limits” stance of early 2022, before the war, to the traditional principles of “non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-targeting of third parties”.

Although China has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, it has not systematically violated them. It is true that China imported more than 100m tonnes of Russian oil in 2023, but that is not a great deal more than it was buying annually before the war. If China stops importing Russian oil and instead buys from elsewhere, it will undoubtedly push up international oil prices, putting huge pressure on the world economy.

Since the war began China has conducted two rounds of diplomatic mediation. Success has proved elusive but no one should doubt China’s desire to end this cruel war through negotiations. That wish shows that China and Russia are very different countries. Russia is seeking to subvert the existing international and regional order by means of war, whereas China wants to resolve disputes peacefully.

With Russia still attacking Ukrainian military positions, critical infrastructure and cities, and possibly willing to escalate further, the chances of a Korea-style armistice look remote. In the absence of a fundamental change in Russia’s political system and ideology, the conflict could become frozen. That would only allow Russia to continue to launch new wars after a respite, putting the world in even greater danger.
https://www.economist.com/by-invitation ... -on-russia