回顾和展望乌克兰情况

[meiyoumajia]

[meiyoumajia]

乌第79旅人：：：：：

[meiyoumajia]

"bakhmut is not strategic important"

ivanivka is not either, right?

is chasiv yar s.i.?

1
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1 more
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1 more (likely, some time from now)










avdiivka
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Ocheretyne






Kostyantynivka???????????



https://www.google.com/maps/place/Bakhm ... ?entry=ttu

[meiyoumajia]

[meiyoumajia]

[meiyoumajia]

so, one russian plan is to cross the dnipro river from around the zaporizhia city?

[meiyoumajia]

very surprisingly

[meiyoumajia]

well

that's something

[meiyoumajia]

[meiyoumajia]

so, one russian plan is to cross the dnipro river from around the zaporizhia city?

https://www.google.com/maps/dir/Avdiivk ... ?entry=ttu


https://www.google.com/maps/dir/Avdiivk ... ?entry=ttu

[meiyoumajia]

also in 2014
in its making


(he has some personal friends/contacts from wagner forces)

[meiyoumajia]

[meiyoumajia]

[meiyoumajia]

in a better overall condition than the first one?

[meiyoumajia]

lucky or not?

(2 whole survivors)

[meiyoumajia]

so, one russian plan is to cross the dnipro river from around the zaporizhia city?

https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/0 ... or-general
An interview with Vadym Skibitsky, deputy head of Ukraine’s military intelligence

He predicts that Russia will first press on with its plan to “liberate” all of Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions, a task unchanged since 2022. He says a Russian order has gone out to “take something” in time for the pomp of Victory Day in Moscow on May 9th, or, failing that, before Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing a week later. The speed and success of the advance will determine when and where the Russians strike next. “Our problem is very simple: we have no weapons. They always knew April and May would be a difficult time for us.”

Ukraine’s immediate concern is its high-ground stronghold in the town of Chasiv Yar, which holds the keys to an onward Russian advance to the last large cities in the Donetsk region (see map). It is probably a matter of time before that city falls in a similar way to Avdiivka, bombed to oblivion by the Russians in February, says the general. “Not today or tomorrow, of course, but all depending on our reserves and supplies.”

Russia has already won a tactical success in the south-west in the village of Ocheretyne, where a recent Ukrainian troop rotation was bungled. Russian forces succeeded in breaking through a first line of defence and have created a salient 25 square kilometres in size. Ukraine is some way from stabilising the situation, while Russia is throwing “everything” it has to achieve a bigger gain. The Russian army is not the hubristic organisation it was in 2022, says the general, and is now operating as a “single body, with a clear plan, and under a single command”.

Looking at a wider horizon, the intelligence chief suggests Russia is gearing up for an assault around the Kharkiv and Sumy regions in the north-east. The timing of this depends on the sturdiness of Ukrainian defences in the Donbas, he says. But he assumes Russia’s main push will begin at the “end of May or beginning of June”. Russia has a total of 514,000 land troops committed to the Ukrainian operation, he says, higher than the 470,000 estimate given last month by General Christopher Cavoli, nato’s top commander. The Ukrainian spymaster says Russia’s northern grouping, based across the border from Kharkiv, is currently 35,000-strong but is set to expand to between 50,000 and 70,000 troops. Russia is also “generating a division of reserves” (ie, between 15,000 and 20,000 men) in central Russia, which they can add to the main effort.

This is “not enough” for an operation to take a major city, he says—a judgment shared by Western military officials, but could be enough for a smaller task. “A quick operation to come in and come out: maybe. But an operation to take Kharkiv, or even Sumy city, is of a different order. The Russians know this. And we know this.” In any event, dark days lie ahead for Kharkiv, a city of 1.2m people that rebuffed Russia’s initial assaults in 2022.

May will be the key month, says the general, with Russia employing a “three-layered” plan to destabilise the country. The main factor is military. Even though America’s Congress belatedly gave the go-ahead for more military aid, it will take weeks before it filters through to the front line. It is unlikely to match Russia’s stock of shells or provide an effective defence against Russia’s low-tech, destructive guided aerial bombs.


The second factor is Russia’s disinformation campaign in Ukraine aimed at undermining Ukrainian mobilisation and the political legitimacy of Volodymyr Zelensky, whose presidential term notionally runs out on May 20th. While the constitution clearly allows its indefinite extension in wartime, his opponents are already emphasising the president’s vulnerability.

A third factor, says the general, is Russia’s relentless campaign to isolate Ukraine internationally.

...
Ukrainian officials worry that the next wave of mobilised recruits will make for unmotivated soldiers with poor morale. One saving grace, says the general, is that Russia faces similar problems. Its army is unrecognisable from the professional corps that started the war. But Russia still has more of them to throw into battle, stretching Ukraine’s already stressed defences.

...
Such wars can only end with treaties, he says. Right now, both sides are jockeying for the “the most favourable position” ahead of potential talks... Russian military production capacity has expanded but will reach a plateau by early 2026, he reckons, due to shortages in material and engineers. Both sides could eventually run out of weapons. But if nothing changes in other respects, Ukraine will run out first.

...
If Ukraine’s neighbours do not find a way of further increasing defence production to help Ukraine, they too will eventually find themselves in Russia’s crosshairs, he argues.
...
The question is whether Europe will repay the favour by keeping Ukraine in the game. “We will keep fighting. We have no choice. We want to live. But the outcome of the war [...] isn’t just down to us.”

[meiyoumajia]

wiki: Generally they (atgms) have an effective range of between 2,500 and 5,500 meters and penetration of up to 900 mm of armor.

[bsmile]

10多年前，乌克兰差不多一半人偏向俄国。
但在那之前，乌克兰就已经在朝乌克兰族化方向快速行走。2007年，与纳粹合作并屠杀数万波兰平民的Shukhevych被正式尊为乌克兰国家英雄。 2010年，bandera也被尊为。。。

到2008年，至少1/6的乌克兰人已经在班得啦的旗下
（那时克里米亚和顿巴斯地区还没有分离出去。）
可见国家内部的转极化/加速分裂
viewtopic.php?t=457460


北约的代理人战争/大冲突从2014年政变/乌克兰内战时就正式开始了。2014年至少有3个外国出生的人成了部长。
minsk协议允许顿巴斯高度自治，但乌克兰不（愿意）履行。主推它的德国女总理后来也称那些谈判只是为了给乌克兰争取（军事上加强它的）时间。
2022年，俄国称乌克兰有2月底到3月初进攻（以完全解决顿巴斯问题）。乌克兰的大多数精锐都被布置到了乌东。
俄罗斯先发制人，从多个方向入侵乌克兰，基本只是乌克兰内部残杀大升级变成了北约+乌对俄战争，俄乌之间大残杀正式开始。

现在乌克兰弱势明显，北约（部分国家）在考虑派部分部队进入某些地区行驶某种职责。

乌克兰的未来有多种不小的可能。
一种比较大的：乌克兰会被分裂成几小块。其中有一块会事实上被罗马尼亚掌控。（在几个月前普京正式讲话中，他特别表示：对罗马尼亚人区没有兴趣。对乌克兰的galicia和匈牙利地区也表示没有兴趣，但没拿它们举例。）

（台湾会成为同类代理吗？）

这里头俄罗斯动手稍微早了些，等到乌军大举进攻乌东的时候造成了口实在越境攻击，至少可以减少侵略的罪名

[meiyoumajia]

这里头俄罗斯动手稍微早了些，等到乌军大举进攻乌东的时候造成了口实在越境攻击，至少可以减少侵略的罪名

那会太晚，来不及应对。乌东民军可能会很快开始崩溃。

乌克兰准备了很久，在乌东建立了很长的非常牢固的防线，以应付俄军介入。。。
乌军发起攻击很可能会是在三月份初。已经把武装力量的一大半主力布置到了乌东地区有时日。
顿巴斯正规武装人力相差悬殊。民军总人数可能都不到5万。。。
装备：开战前几个月内有很多视频显示：从顿涅斯和卢甘斯克民军坦克和大炮就知道他们的武器装备相当落后。后来俄军把不少缴获的武器装备配给他们，也都比较落后。民军只有几个营（比如斯巴达营--实际人数应该大大超过普通营）有较强的战斗力/攻击力。绝大多数基本没有进攻能力，几乎只是防守力量。（但在去年，民军已经被正式整合入俄军---正如wagner在更晚的时候，也就是prigozhin和其它几个最高层坠机死了以后。）

[meiyoumajia]

open to ...?

lol

russia holds a lot more pows than ukraine