Breaking!复旦副院长冯玉军在The Economist长文:俄罗斯必败

[长廊夜话]

楼上的几人明显想当然。
中共国现在走的路，行的事明显和张维为一条裤子。

这个姓冯的像是西方“间谍”

现在国内的氛围，没有允许，谁敢发异议？尤其是这么高的位置，其实国内不看好俄罗斯的高层多了去了，但习包子支持俄，就看高层怎么能说服他了，毕竟为了中国本身的利益，是不应该支持俄的，会失去太多了。

[chinav5]

可以跟你赌一块钱，大毛子要能赢才是会见鬼。

估计大毛子跟上次入侵阿富汗一个结局。

别尼玛意淫了

就一老逼将给请去拉个场子而已

毛子已经赢定了

傻逼才看不出来

[denizen]

这个论据论证一塌糊涂。

但论点暴露立场，tg希望战争长期化，鼓励西方加大投入。

美帝就该按照敌人想干嘛就偏不干嘛的原则来。

特别是tg懒得露出一次马jio，美帝还不赶紧把所有匪蝶一网打尽？

本版就有好几个缝纫机手，天天哼唧俄罗斯必败的。

[TSG]

北约都去军事化了，如果鹅毛再胜下去，白宫就该挂镰刀斧头了把

做尼玛大头梦呢，俄乌战争前北约自己都说自己是脑瘫，一打起来满血复活，顺带着东亚的AUKUS就是小北约对付你憋的 lol

[sunnycoast]

The Economist 是英美帝国主义的人民日报，对每周大事定政治基调。
之前都是自己staff写的不记名文章，这两年每期有两三篇by invitation的外来署名文章。
最新一期经济学家里有一篇，冯玉军论俄乌战争和中俄关系。

冯玉军，复旦大学国际问题研究院副院长，俄罗斯中亚研究中心主任，教授，博士生导师。曾任中国现代国际关系研究院俄罗斯研究所所长、研究员、博士生导师、院学术委员。中国中俄关系史研究会副秘书长，中国俄罗斯东欧中亚学会、中国上海合作组织研究中心、中俄友协常务理事。
https://brgg.fudan.edu.cn/teaminfo_14.html

By Invitation | A Chinese view of Russia
Russia is sure to lose in Ukraine, reckons a Chinese expert on Russia
Feng Yujun says the war has strained Sino-Russian relations
Apr 11th 2024

THE WAR between Russia and Ukraine has been catastrophic for both countries. With neither side enjoying an overwhelming advantage and their political positions completely at odds, the fighting is unlikely to end soon. One thing is clear, though: the conflict is a post-cold-war watershed that will have a profound, lasting global impact.

Four main factors will influence the course of the war. The first is the level of resistance and national unity shown by Ukrainians, which has until now been extraordinary. The second is international support for Ukraine, which, though recently falling short of the country’s expectations, remains broad.

The third factor is the nature of modern warfare, a contest that turns on a combination of industrial might and command, control, communications and intelligence systems. One reason Russia has struggled in this war is that it is yet to recover from the dramatic deindustrialisation it suffered after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The final factor is information. When it comes to decision-making, Vladimir Putin is trapped in an information cocoon, thanks to his having been in power so long. The Russian president and his national-security team lack access to accurate intelligence. The system they operate lacks an efficient mechanism for correcting errors. Their Ukrainian counterparts are more flexible and effective.

In combination, these four factors make Russia’s eventual defeat inevitable. In time it will be forced to withdraw from all occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea. Its nuclear capability is no guarantee of success. Didn’t a nuclear-armed America withdraw from Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan?

Though the war has been hugely costly for Ukraine, the strength and unity of its resistance has shattered the myth that Russia is militarily invincible. Ukraine may yet rise from the ashes. When the war ends, it can look forward to the possibility of joining the European Union and NATO.

The war is a turning-point for Russia. It has consigned Mr Putin’s regime to broad international isolation. He has also had to deal with difficult domestic political undercurrents, from the rebellion by the mercenaries of the Wagner Group and other pockets of the military—for instance in Belgorod—to ethnic tensions in several Russian regions and the recent terrorist attack in Moscow. These show that political risk in Russia is very high. Mr Putin may recently have been re-elected, but he faces all kinds of possible black-swan events.

Adding to the risks confronting Mr Putin, the war has convinced more and more former Soviet republics that Russia’s imperial ambition threatens their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Increasingly aware that a Russian victory is out of the question, these states are distancing themselves from Moscow in different ways, from forging economic-development policies that are less dependent on Russia to pursuing more balanced foreign policies. As a result, prospects for the Eurasian integration that Russia advocates have dimmed.

The war, meanwhile, has made Europe wake up to the enormous threat that Russia’s military aggression poses to the continent’s security and the international order, bringing post-cold-war EU-Russia detente to an end. Many European countries have given up their illusions about Mr Putin’s Russia.

At the same time, the war has jolted NATO out of what Emmanuel Macron, the French president, called its “brain-dead” state. With most NATO countries increasing their military spending, the alliance’s forward military deployment in eastern Europe has been greatly shored up. The addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO highlights Mr Putin’s inability to use the war to prevent the alliance’s expansion.

The war will also help to reshape the UN Security Council. It has highlighted the body’s inability to effectively assume its responsibility of maintaining world peace and regional security owing to the abuse of veto power by some permanent members. This has riled the international community, increasing the chances that reform of the Security Council will speed up. Germany, Japan, India and other countries are likely to become permanent members and the five current permanent members may lose their veto power. Without reform, the paralysis that has become the hallmark of the Security Council will lead the world to an even more dangerous place.

China’s relations with Russia are not fixed, and they have been affected by the events of the past two years. Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, has just visited Beijing, where he and his Chinese counterpart once again emphasised the close ties between their countries. But the trip appears to have been more diplomatic effort by Russia to show it is not alone than genuine love-in. Shrewd observers note that China’s stance towards Russia has reverted from the “no limits” stance of early 2022, before the war, to the traditional principles of “non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-targeting of third parties”.

Although China has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, it has not systematically violated them. It is true that China imported more than 100m tonnes of Russian oil in 2023, but that is not a great deal more than it was buying annually before the war. If China stops importing Russian oil and instead buys from elsewhere, it will undoubtedly push up international oil prices, putting huge pressure on the world economy.

Since the war began China has conducted two rounds of diplomatic mediation. Success has proved elusive but no one should doubt China’s desire to end this cruel war through negotiations. That wish shows that China and Russia are very different countries. Russia is seeking to subvert the existing international and regional order by means of war, whereas China wants to resolve disputes peacefully.

With Russia still attacking Ukrainian military positions, critical infrastructure and cities, and possibly willing to escalate further, the chances of a Korea-style armistice look remote. In the absence of a fundamental change in Russia’s political system and ideology, the conflict could become frozen. That would only allow Russia to continue to launch new wars after a respite, putting the world in even greater danger.
https://www.economist.com/by-invitation ... -on-russia

这是好事啊。 你看我兔也有支持二毛的啊 不是全面支持大毛

[cellcycle1]

The Economist 是英美帝国主义的人民日报，对每周大事定政治基调。
之前都是自己staff写的不记名文章，这两年每期有两三篇by invitation的外来署名文章。
最新一期经济学家里有一篇，冯玉军论俄乌战争和中俄关系。

冯玉军，复旦大学国际问题研究院副院长，俄罗斯中亚研究中心主任，教授，博士生导师。曾任中国现代国际关系研究院俄罗斯研究所所长、研究员、博士生导师、院学术委员。中国中俄关系史研究会副秘书长，中国俄罗斯东欧中亚学会、中国上海合作组织研究中心、中俄友协常务理事。
https://brgg.fudan.edu.cn/teaminfo_14.html

By Invitation | A Chinese view of Russia
Russia is sure to lose in Ukraine, reckons a Chinese expert on Russia
Feng Yujun says the war has strained Sino-Russian relations
Apr 11th 2024

THE WAR between Russia and Ukraine has been catastrophic for both countries. With neither side enjoying an overwhelming advantage and their political positions completely at odds, the fighting is unlikely to end soon. One thing is clear, though: the conflict is a post-cold-war watershed that will have a profound, lasting global impact.

Four main factors will influence the course of the war. The first is the level of resistance and national unity shown by Ukrainians, which has until now been extraordinary. The second is international support for Ukraine, which, though recently falling short of the country’s expectations, remains broad.

The third factor is the nature of modern warfare, a contest that turns on a combination of industrial might and command, control, communications and intelligence systems. One reason Russia has struggled in this war is that it is yet to recover from the dramatic deindustrialisation it suffered after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The final factor is information. When it comes to decision-making, Vladimir Putin is trapped in an information cocoon, thanks to his having been in power so long. The Russian president and his national-security team lack access to accurate intelligence. The system they operate lacks an efficient mechanism for correcting errors. Their Ukrainian counterparts are more flexible and effective.

In combination, these four factors make Russia’s eventual defeat inevitable. In time it will be forced to withdraw from all occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea. Its nuclear capability is no guarantee of success. Didn’t a nuclear-armed America withdraw from Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan?

Though the war has been hugely costly for Ukraine, the strength and unity of its resistance has shattered the myth that Russia is militarily invincible. Ukraine may yet rise from the ashes. When the war ends, it can look forward to the possibility of joining the European Union and NATO.

The war is a turning-point for Russia. It has consigned Mr Putin’s regime to broad international isolation. He has also had to deal with difficult domestic political undercurrents, from the rebellion by the mercenaries of the Wagner Group and other pockets of the military—for instance in Belgorod—to ethnic tensions in several Russian regions and the recent terrorist attack in Moscow. These show that political risk in Russia is very high. Mr Putin may recently have been re-elected, but he faces all kinds of possible black-swan events.

Adding to the risks confronting Mr Putin, the war has convinced more and more former Soviet republics that Russia’s imperial ambition threatens their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Increasingly aware that a Russian victory is out of the question, these states are distancing themselves from Moscow in different ways, from forging economic-development policies that are less dependent on Russia to pursuing more balanced foreign policies. As a result, prospects for the Eurasian integration that Russia advocates have dimmed.

The war, meanwhile, has made Europe wake up to the enormous threat that Russia’s military aggression poses to the continent’s security and the international order, bringing post-cold-war EU-Russia detente to an end. Many European countries have given up their illusions about Mr Putin’s Russia.

At the same time, the war has jolted NATO out of what Emmanuel Macron, the French president, called its “brain-dead” state. With most NATO countries increasing their military spending, the alliance’s forward military deployment in eastern Europe has been greatly shored up. The addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO highlights Mr Putin’s inability to use the war to prevent the alliance’s expansion.

The war will also help to reshape the UN Security Council. It has highlighted the body’s inability to effectively assume its responsibility of maintaining world peace and regional security owing to the abuse of veto power by some permanent members. This has riled the international community, increasing the chances that reform of the Security Council will speed up. Germany, Japan, India and other countries are likely to become permanent members and the five current permanent members may lose their veto power. Without reform, the paralysis that has become the hallmark of the Security Council will lead the world to an even more dangerous place.

China’s relations with Russia are not fixed, and they have been affected by the events of the past two years. Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, has just visited Beijing, where he and his Chinese counterpart once again emphasised the close ties between their countries. But the trip appears to have been more diplomatic effort by Russia to show it is not alone than genuine love-in. Shrewd observers note that China’s stance towards Russia has reverted from the “no limits” stance of early 2022, before the war, to the traditional principles of “non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-targeting of third parties”.

Although China has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, it has not systematically violated them. It is true that China imported more than 100m tonnes of Russian oil in 2023, but that is not a great deal more than it was buying annually before the war. If China stops importing Russian oil and instead buys from elsewhere, it will undoubtedly push up international oil prices, putting huge pressure on the world economy.

Since the war began China has conducted two rounds of diplomatic mediation. Success has proved elusive but no one should doubt China’s desire to end this cruel war through negotiations. That wish shows that China and Russia are very different countries. Russia is seeking to subvert the existing international and regional order by means of war, whereas China wants to resolve disputes peacefully.

With Russia still attacking Ukrainian military positions, critical infrastructure and cities, and possibly willing to escalate further, the chances of a Korea-style armistice look remote. In the absence of a fundamental change in Russia’s political system and ideology, the conflict could become frozen. That would only allow Russia to continue to launch new wars after a respite, putting the world in even greater danger.
https://www.economist.com/by-invitation ... -on-russia

English ? so, he is in England ?

[noid2]

河北大学

啥意思？

[Dashabi01]

这头傻逼是号称研究日本的那个吧？书10年前就发现这是头猪。

麻痹复旦真是藏污纳垢之所。

主要是这个傻逼提出的那几条论据论点毫无新意
还是西方视角那些自说自话的酸臭垃圾
如果说2年前甚至1年前它这么说也就罢了

现在它还重复当初那个”降美弃俄”的胡速跪的那套陈词滥调
而且还搬出所谓国际社会，还要装模作样站在所谓正义立场上
在今天美西方无脑支持以色列种族屠杀，国际信誉彻底破产的当下

这货汉奸殖畜的嘴脸真是暴露无疑

[Dashabi01]

The Economist 是英美帝国主义的人民日报，对每周大事定政治基调。
之前都是自己staff写的不记名文章，这两年每期有两三篇by invitation的外来署名文章。
最新一期经济学家里有一篇，冯玉军论俄乌战争和中俄关系。

冯玉军，复旦大学国际问题研究院副院长，俄罗斯中亚研究中心主任，教授，博士生导师。曾任中国现代国际关系研究院俄罗斯研究所所长、研究员、博士生导师、院学术委员。中国中俄关系史研究会副秘书长，中国俄罗斯东欧中亚学会、中国上海合作组织研究中心、中俄友协常务理事。
https://brgg.fudan.edu.cn/teaminfo_14.html

By Invitation | A Chinese view of Russia
Russia is sure to lose in Ukraine, reckons a Chinese expert on Russia
Feng Yujun says the war has strained Sino-Russian relations
Apr 11th 2024

THE WAR between Russia and Ukraine has been catastrophic for both countries. With neither side enjoying an overwhelming advantage and their political positions completely at odds, the fighting is unlikely to end soon. One thing is clear, though: the conflict is a post-cold-war watershed that will have a profound, lasting global impact.

Four main factors will influence the course of the war. The first is the level of resistance and national unity shown by Ukrainians, which has until now been extraordinary. The second is international support for Ukraine, which, though recently falling short of the country’s expectations, remains broad.

The third factor is the nature of modern warfare, a contest that turns on a combination of industrial might and command, control, communications and intelligence systems. One reason Russia has struggled in this war is that it is yet to recover from the dramatic deindustrialisation it suffered after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The final factor is information. When it comes to decision-making, Vladimir Putin is trapped in an information cocoon, thanks to his having been in power so long. The Russian president and his national-security team lack access to accurate intelligence. The system they operate lacks an efficient mechanism for correcting errors. Their Ukrainian counterparts are more flexible and effective.

In combination, these four factors make Russia’s eventual defeat inevitable. In time it will be forced to withdraw from all occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea. Its nuclear capability is no guarantee of success. Didn’t a nuclear-armed America withdraw from Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan?

Though the war has been hugely costly for Ukraine, the strength and unity of its resistance has shattered the myth that Russia is militarily invincible. Ukraine may yet rise from the ashes. When the war ends, it can look forward to the possibility of joining the European Union and NATO.

The war is a turning-point for Russia. It has consigned Mr Putin’s regime to broad international isolation. He has also had to deal with difficult domestic political undercurrents, from the rebellion by the mercenaries of the Wagner Group and other pockets of the military—for instance in Belgorod—to ethnic tensions in several Russian regions and the recent terrorist attack in Moscow. These show that political risk in Russia is very high. Mr Putin may recently have been re-elected, but he faces all kinds of possible black-swan events.

Adding to the risks confronting Mr Putin, the war has convinced more and more former Soviet republics that Russia’s imperial ambition threatens their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Increasingly aware that a Russian victory is out of the question, these states are distancing themselves from Moscow in different ways, from forging economic-development policies that are less dependent on Russia to pursuing more balanced foreign policies. As a result, prospects for the Eurasian integration that Russia advocates have dimmed.

The war, meanwhile, has made Europe wake up to the enormous threat that Russia’s military aggression poses to the continent’s security and the international order, bringing post-cold-war EU-Russia detente to an end. Many European countries have given up their illusions about Mr Putin’s Russia.

At the same time, the war has jolted NATO out of what Emmanuel Macron, the French president, called its “brain-dead” state. With most NATO countries increasing their military spending, the alliance’s forward military deployment in eastern Europe has been greatly shored up. The addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO highlights Mr Putin’s inability to use the war to prevent the alliance’s expansion.

The war will also help to reshape the UN Security Council. It has highlighted the body’s inability to effectively assume its responsibility of maintaining world peace and regional security owing to the abuse of veto power by some permanent members. This has riled the international community, increasing the chances that reform of the Security Council will speed up. Germany, Japan, India and other countries are likely to become permanent members and the five current permanent members may lose their veto power. Without reform, the paralysis that has become the hallmark of the Security Council will lead the world to an even more dangerous place.

China’s relations with Russia are not fixed, and they have been affected by the events of the past two years. Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, has just visited Beijing, where he and his Chinese counterpart once again emphasised the close ties between their countries. But the trip appears to have been more diplomatic effort by Russia to show it is not alone than genuine love-in. Shrewd observers note that China’s stance towards Russia has reverted from the “no limits” stance of early 2022, before the war, to the traditional principles of “non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-targeting of third parties”.

Although China has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, it has not systematically violated them. It is true that China imported more than 100m tonnes of Russian oil in 2023, but that is not a great deal more than it was buying annually before the war. If China stops importing Russian oil and instead buys from elsewhere, it will undoubtedly push up international oil prices, putting huge pressure on the world economy.

Since the war began China has conducted two rounds of diplomatic mediation. Success has proved elusive but no one should doubt China’s desire to end this cruel war through negotiations. That wish shows that China and Russia are very different countries. Russia is seeking to subvert the existing international and regional order by means of war, whereas China wants to resolve disputes peacefully.

With Russia still attacking Ukrainian military positions, critical infrastructure and cities, and possibly willing to escalate further, the chances of a Korea-style armistice look remote. In the absence of a fundamental change in Russia’s political system and ideology, the conflict could become frozen. That would only allow Russia to continue to launch new wars after a respite, putting the world in even greater danger.
https://www.economist.com/by-invitation ... -on-russia

这逼居然还是中俄友协的理事？真是滑稽透顶！

[beijingren3]

河北太监和汉奸

[noid2]

河北大学

估计没有人知道在哪个城市

与这个主题有关吗？

[ragged1]

包子内外政策为什么不断翻大饼，其实是因为包子对内根本就没有控制力，上海一只是反习中心，而且实力越来越大，胆子也越来越大。